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This paper analyzes recent fiscal policies of nonrenewable resource exporting countries in Latin 
America and the Caribbean in the context of sharp swings in resource prices. Fiscal policies were 
predominantly procyclical during the boom period 2003-08 but to significantly differing degrees 
within the sample. Countries that pursued more conservative fiscal policies during the boom were 
then able to implement countercyclical fiscal policies during the downturn; moreover, they reduced 
or maintained their fiscal vulnerability to resource shocks, while their long-term fiscal sustainability 
positions improved or were broadly unchanged.  However, these dimensions of fiscal policy did not 
seem to be linked to fiscal rules or resource funds, as countries with such institutions displayed a 




Este trabajo analiza las recientes políticas fiscales de países exportadores de recursos naturales no 
renovables de América Latina y el Caribe, en un contexto de fuertes oscilaciones en los precios de 
los recursos. Las políticas fiscales fueron predominantemente procíclicas durante el período de auge 
comprendido en el período 2003-08, pero en diferentes grados dentro de la muestra de países 
considerada. Los países que persiguieron políticas fiscales más conservadoras durante el auge 
pudieron implementar políticas contracíclicas durante la recesión; mas aún, ellos redujeron o 
mantuvieron su vulnerabilidad fiscal a shocks de recursos naturales, mientras su sostenibilidad 
fiscal de largo plazo mejoró o continuó relativamente sin cambios. Sin embargo, estas dimensiones 
de la política fiscal no se vieron ligadas a reglas fiscales o fondos asociados a los recursos, o como 
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1  Introduction 
In the last decade, the prices of nonrenewable resources that constitute a critical source of 
fiscal revenue in many Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries recorded sharp swings 
correlated with economic growth developments in the world and in the region.  
 
Against this background, the present paper analyzes the fiscal policies of nonrenewable 
resource exporting countries (NRECs) in LAC during the economic and resource price cycle of 
the last decade. The analysis focuses on two periods: the boom years, 2003-08; and the more 
recent period, characterized by the global financial crisis and the receding of resource prices. It 
examines the role of fiscal policy vis-à-vis fluctuations in economic activity; the evolution of 
short-term fiscal vulnerability to resource price shocks and long-term fiscal sustainability; and 
the role played by fiscal rules and resource funds in determining these aspects of fiscal policy. 
The countries covered in the study are Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Venezuela. 
 
The paper starts by presenting background information on recent trends in nonrenewable 
resource prices and the relevance of nonrenewable resource revenues in the NRECs covered in 
the study (section 2). It then proceeds to address four sets of questions:  
 
  What were the countries’ fiscal policy responses to the recent economic and resource 
price cycle (section 3)? How expansionary or contractionary were fiscal policies in the 
boom and the downturn in LAC NRECs? To what extent were these policies procyclical 
or countercyclical? Is there a relationship between the degree of procyclicality of fiscal 
policies during the boom and during the slump? How do policies compare to NRECs in 
other regions? 
 
Several cross-country studies have analyzed the evolution of the fiscal stance in LAC 
countries in the recent past.1 In an early study assessing the fiscal stance in a sample of nine 
countries during 1981-2004 and linking it to the economic cycle, Alberola and Montero (2006) 
found that fiscal policy had been procyclical during that period. Izquierdo and Talvi (2008) 
focused on the seven largest Latin American countries during 2003-07 and concluded that 
fiscal policy had been expansionary. In contrast, Vladkova-Hollar and Zettelmeyer (2008), 
using a different methodology, found that fiscal policy had been contractionary in most LAC 
countries during the same period. Di Bella (2009) explored the fiscal responses of LAC 
countries to the 2009 downturn and concluded that countries with more prudent fiscal policies 
during the upswing were able to implement more expansionary fiscal policies during the 
downturn. Daude, Melguizo, and Neut (2010) found that, although fiscal policies in LAC 
countries during the last two decades had been procyclical, sustainability had recently 
improved. 
 
In this paper the analysis of the cyclical stance of fiscal policies takes into account 
explicitly the special characteristics of revenues arising from nonrenewable resources. It 
proposes an approach to assess the fiscal stance based on the nonresource primary balance that 
is simpler and more reliable than other approaches used in the literature. Comparisons with 
the fiscal policies of middle-income NRECs in other regions are also presented to complement 
the analysis.  
 
  How did fiscal vulnerabilities to resource price shocks evolve during the recent cycle 
(section 4)? Resource price shocks are a fact of life for LAC NRECs. In the past, because 
of financing and sustainability problems, sharp declines in these prices often led to the 
need to implement contractionary fiscal policies during downturns, with sudden and 
                                                 
1 Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Talvi and Vegh (2000) are the classic earlier studies.   2
painful adjustments. Have the fiscal positions of LAC NRECs become more resilient to 
potential resource price shocks? Are there relationships between the fiscal policies 
implemented during the boom and current fiscal vulnerabilities to resource price 
shocks?  
 
The paper assesses the fiscal vulnerability of NRECs in the region to changes in resource 
prices to derive the sensitivity of net financing requirements to these prices. In turn, this 
depends primarily on the size of the financial buffers that countries accumulated during the 
boom years.  
 
  Have the fiscal positions of LAC NRECs become more sustainable (section 5)? How did 
long-term fiscal sustainability in LAC NRECs evolve during the recent cycle? Are those 
developments linked to the degree of procyclicality during the boom?  
 
The paper examines the long-term fiscal sustainability of NRECs in LAC and its evolution 
over the recent economic and resource price cycle. The approach used in the paper extends 
conventional debt sustainability analysis to take into account explicitly the exhaustibility of 
the resources in the ground. It also requires making explicit assumptions regarding 
intertemporal welfare.  
 
  Finally, what was the role played by fiscal rules and resource funds in the various 
dimensions of fiscal policy during the recent cycle (section 6)? Most NRECs in the 
region have put in place numerical fiscal rules and/or resource funds to help address 
the significant challenges that volatile, uncertain, and exhaustible resource revenues 
pose to fiscal management. In many cases, rules and funds have also been motivated by 
political economy considerations: they have been seen as potentially useful instruments 
to contain spending pressures or to enhance the government’s credibility to manage 
resource revenues. 
 
The paper looks at the role played by these mechanisms during the recent cycle. Fiscal 
rules and funds show wide variety of design among NRECs in the region: what were their main 
characteristics, and what was their implementation experience during the boom and the 
slump?2 Were there links between the presence of rules or funds and the actual fiscal policy 
responses to the cycle? The paper highlights the complex design, implementation, and political 
economy issues for fiscal rules and funds in NRECs that are related to the volatility, 
uncertainty, and exhaustibility of resource revenues. It offers some suggestions for the design 
of these mechanisms in NRECs based on conceptual considerations and lessons from country 
experiences. 
2  Background 
The prices of nonrenewable resources recorded sharp swings in the last decade. This was 
particularly the case for oil, gas, copper, and zinc, critical resources for some Latin American 
countries. The peak annual average prices in real terms in 2006-08 were more than three times 
their 2001 values (see Figure 1).3 The prices of those nonrenewable resources receded strongly 
afterwards, but are still on average twice as high as at the beginning of the decade. The 
pattern in those prices during the last decade can be discussed analytically as a price “cycle”, 
with a “boom” period until 2008 and a downturn in 2009. 
 
                                                 
2 Appendix A provides a detailed description of the workings of the fiscal rules and funds implemented in 
the sample countries. 
3 The price of oil used in this paper is the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) basket of oil prices, which 
is a simple average of the prices for Brent, Dubai, and West Texas Intermediate grades.   3






























Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database. 
 
    The large increase in oil prices in real terms recorded during 2003-08 took place 
together with a very strong expansion in global economic activity (see Figure 2). This was in 
sharp contrast with the sizable weakening in world GDP growth in the context of two   spikes 
in oil prices recorded in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
 
Nonrenewable resources are a critical source of fiscal revenue for some Latin American 
and Caribbean (LAC) countries (see Table 1). This paper focuses on a sample of LAC 
nonrenewable resource-exporting countries (NRECs) where fiscal revenue from nonrenewable 
resources (based on readily available information) accounted for at least 20 percent of total 
fiscal revenue over 2005-09: Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Venezuela.4  These countries can be split into two groups: oil-exporting countries (OECs: 
Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela)5 and mineral-exporting 
countries (MECs: Chile and Peru). Dependence on nonrenewable resource revenues is greater 
in LAC OECs (40 percent in 2005-09) than in LAC MECs (20 percent). This is partly due to a 
larger government take from oil than from minerals, as can be seen from comparing the ratios 
to GDP of fiscal resource revenue and resource sector size.6 
 
                                                 
4 The coverage of the fiscal accounts refers to the nonfinancial public sector (NFPS) (i.e., including 
national resource companies) for Bolivia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela; the general government for 
Chile; and the central government for Peru (national definition that includes regional governments, which 
are the beneficiaries of the canon minero) and Trinidad and Tobago. Part of the operating expenditure of 
Venezuela’s national oil company (PDVSA) has been imputed as nonresource spending to capture the 
company’s extensive quasi-fiscal spending. 
5 Throughout this paper, the term “oil” is used as a substitute for the more encompassing terms 
“hydrocarbon” or “petroleum”; gas is the more important resource in Bolivia and Trinidad and Tobago. 
6 Some OECs record oil revenue net of implicit or explicit domestic fuel subsidies. Resource revenue 
dependency ratios would be higher if “gross” oil revenue figures were used (together with higher nonoil 
spending in the form of fuel subsidies).   4
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Table 1: Resource Sector Size and Revenue, Simple Averages, 2005-2009. 
Resource 
Size *
In Percent of 
Total 
Revenues
In Percent of 
GDP
Bolivia 12 28 10
Chile 19 23 6
Ecuador 16 25 7
Mexico 83 6 8
Peru 11 20 3
Trinidad and Tobago 44 57 18
Venezuela 27 53 19
OECs 21 40 12




In Percent of 
Total 
Revenues
In Percent of 
GDP
Bolivia 12 28 10
Chile 19 23 6
Ecuador 16 25 7
Mexico 83 6 8
Peru 11 20 3
Trinidad and Tobago 44 57 18
Venezuela 27 53 19
OECs 21 40 12
MECs 15 22 5
Fiscal Resource Revenues
 
(*) Resource sector un percent of GDP. 
Source: IMF data and national sources. 
 
The specific characteristics of fiscal resource revenues bring about difficult challenges 
for fiscal policy design and implementation in NRECs:  
  The high volatility and uncertainty of nonrenewable resource revenues complicate 
fiscal management, budgetary planning, and the efficient use of public resources. 
During the recent cycle in resource prices (2003-09), the volatility of total fiscal revenue 
in real terms in LAC NRECs was much higher than in a comparator group of LAC 
countries (see Figure 3);7 the standard deviation of percentage changes of total revenue 
in real terms was 16 percent in the former compared to 4½ percent in the latter.8 
  The exhaustibility of the resources raises complex issues of intergenerational equity, in 
terms of how much to consume and save, as well as of long-term fiscal sustainability.  
  With resource revenue largely arising from abroad, the fiscal spending of these 
resources domestically may generate inflationary pressures and lead to reduced 
competitiveness of nonresource export and import-competing sectors (Dutch Disease). 
 
In addition to the underlying characteristics of resource revenues, political economy and 
institutional factors (such as, for example, earmarking and revenue-sharing provisions in 
Ecuador and Bolivia, respectively) can add to the challenges noted above. They can exacerbate 
spending pressures, particularly when revenue is rising as in the 2003-08 boom.  
 
                                                 
7 Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, 
Paraguay, and Uruguay. 
8 In some countries, the increases in resource revenues during the recent boom were also due to changes 
in fiscal regimes aimed at increasing government take (e.g., Chile and Venezuela) and nationalizations 
(e.g., Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela).   5






























Source: IMF data and national sources. 
3  Has Fiscal Policy Been Procyclical During The Recent Cycle? 
Has fiscal policy been expansionary in good times and contractionary in bad times? To 
what extent has fiscal policy helped to dampen business cycle fluctuations in NRECs? Our 
analysis starts by examining the evolution of one of the most widely used fiscal policy 
indicators, the primary balance-to-GDP ratio together with real GDP growth dynamics. We 
then discuss some important limitations of this approach and the ways in which the literature 
has attempted to address some of its shortcomings. Finally, we propose an alternative 
approach to assess the fiscal stance in the short run that is simpler and more reliable than 
other approaches used in the literature.  
 
As background, the average growth rates of real GDP in LAC NRECs accelerated during 
2003-08 but fell dramatically in 2009. All countries except Mexico experienced markedly higher 
growth rates during 2003-08 than in the previous six years.9 In all countries there was a 
pronounced slowdown in 2009 and some countries recorded significant output declines. 
 
Looking simply at the evolution of the primary balance-to-GDP ratio would suggest that in 
the majority of LAC NRECs fiscal policy was contractionary during 2003-08 and was uniformly 
expansionary in 2009 (see Figure 4). The primary balance ratios improved in most countries 
during the boom and deteriorated in all countries in 2009. 
 













































Source: IMF data and national sources. 
 
                                                 
9 Mexico was an exception because of the strong recovery that followed the Tequila crisis in the mid 
1990s.   6
The combination of a seemingly contractionary fiscal policy with relatively high growth 
rates and a seemingly expansionary fiscal policy with low growth rates might suggest 
predominantly countercyclical fiscal policy responses to the economic cycle.  
 
However, this type of assessment of the fiscal stance in NRECs based on primary 
balance ratios to GDP would be misleading for several reasons: 
  In NRECs the primary balance is not a good indicator to assess the impact of fiscal 
policy on domestic demand because it does not take into account the specific nature of 
resource revenues. These largely originate from abroad and therefore do not affect the 
purchasing power of domestic economic agents. Thus, changes in the primary balance 
arising from fluctuations in these revenues should be expected to have limited effects 
on domestic demand. 
  The analysis does not control for the influence of the nonresource economic cycle on 
nonresource government revenues. 
  Resource prices can have major effects on the observed ratios of fiscal variables to GDP 
because the resource and nonresource GDP deflators can and often do deviate 
markedly, making nominal GDP quite volatile. Changes in resource prices can 
therefore drive large changes in conventional fiscal policy indicators that make their 
interpretation difficult.10 
 
Alberola and Montero (2006), Izquierdo and Talvi (2008), and Vladkova-Hollar and 
Zettelmeyer (2008) attempted to address the first and second issues mentioned above by 
distinguishing between resource and nonresource revenues, and by estimating separately the 
structural (i.e., permanent) level for each. They defined structural fiscal balances as the sum of 
structural resource and nonresource revenues net of government expenditures, and 
characterized the fiscal stance by analyzing the changes in the estimated structural fiscal 
balances.11 
 
A key drawback of this approach is that the structural level of resource revenues is subject 
to major estimation uncertainty resulting from the highly volatile and unpredictable evolution 
of resource prices and the nature of the stochastic process that drives them.12 In fact, Izquierdo 
and Talvi (2008) and Vladkova-Hollar and Zettelmeyer (2008) arrived at opposite conclusions 
on the fiscal stance during 2003-07 mainly because of differences in their assumptions about 
the persistence of resource price changes. 
 
For the reasons discussed above, to assess the fiscal stance in NRECs, it is preferable to 
abstract from government resource revenue, eschew structural resource revenue estimates, and 
refrain from using total GDP as the scaling factor. The nonresource primary balance (NRPB) 
measured in percent of nonresource GDP (NRGDP) fulfils these requirements (Barnett and 
Ossowski, 2003; Medas and Zakharova, 2009).13 
                                                 
10 For instance, a lower nonresource deficit in nominal terms might come hand in hand with a higher 
nonresource deficit-to-GDP ratio if, as a result of a decline in international resource prices, nominal GDP 
falls proportionally more than the nonresource deficit. Barnett and Ossowski (2003) provide examples. 
11 Previous studies such as Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Talvi and Vegh (2000) did not attempt to 
estimate structural fiscal balances. 
12 In a major recent study of crude oil prices, Hamilton (2008) finds that the statistical evidence is 
consistent with the view that the price of oil in real terms seems to follow a random walk without drift. 
He notes that to predict the price of oil one quarter, one year, or one decade ahead it would not be at all 
naïve to offer as forecast the current price—though he emphasizes the enormous uncertainty surrounding 
such forecasts. 
13 This approach is therefore closer to Di Bella (2009), who also relied on the change in the NRPB to 
assess the fiscal stance in the short run but scaled it in percent of total GDP instead of NRGDP. As 
discussed above, this can lead to spurious estimated effects as changes in the ratio could be mainly driven 
by changes in the denominator resulting from changes in resource prices.   7
 
The evolution of the NRPB as a ratio to NRGDP tells a completely different story from that 
obtained from the primary balance (see Figure 5). It suggests that fiscal policy in most LAC 
NRECs was expansionary during 2003-08, and was more mixed in 2009. This finding is, 
however, subject to the important caveat that the measured NRPB does not include domestic 
fuel subsidies (which are implicit in several countries) due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable, 
time-consistent, and methodologically uniform estimates for a number of countries (Appendix 
B). Appendix C sets out the main factors underlying the evolution of NRPBs in the sample 
countries. 
 
To study the relationship between the fiscal stance and the economic cycle with more 
precision we need to measure the economic cycle more carefully and assess the NRPB adjusted 
for the influence of the cycle. We measure the nonresource economic cycle by quantifying the 
nonresource output gap (NROG) applying the standard Hodrick-Prescott filter to the annual 
time series of NRGDP in real terms.14 15 The NROG is defined as actual NRGDP minus trend 
NRGDP (measured in percent of trend NRGDP).  
 












































Source: IMF data and national sources. 
 
In this context, we define fiscal policy as either expansionary or contractionary. The 
starting point is that the NRPB can be broken down as the sum of the cyclically-adjusted 
NRPB and the cyclical NRPB. Then, fiscal policy is defined as contractionary when the change 
in the cyclically-adjusted NRPB (canrpb) is positive (  0 canrpb ), and is expansionary 
when the change is negative ( 0 canrpb ).  
 
Following the standard methodology to compute cyclically-adjusted balances (see 
Fedelino, Ivanova, and Horton, 2009, pp. 4-5), we estimate the canrpb for each country during 
2003-09 using the following formula: 
 
    (1 – ( 1) ) – (1 ( 1) ),
rg canrpb r NROG g NROG  
                                                 
14 We use the standard smoothing parameter for annual time series λ=100. The sample period for which 
the output gap is computed starts in 1980. To address the endpoint problem of the HP filter we used 
NRGDP annual time series projections up to 2015 based on the IMF’s latest WEO. 
15 An alternative method would be to use the production function approach (Giorno and others, 1995).  
However, estimates of the cycle based on this method require the availability of reliable data on the use of 
labor and capital stocks for the nonresource sector. As regards the decomposition of a series into a trend 
and a cyclical component, the methodologies include: the Beveridge-Nelson approach, the unobservable 
component approach, the Baxter-King filter, and the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Each of them entails some 
advantages and drawbacks. We chose the Hodrick-Prescott filter because it is simple, transparent, and 
continues to be the most commonly used filter in empirical studies and policy analysis.     8
 
where  canrpb is the cyclically-adjusted NRPB measured in percent of potential 
NRGDP, r is the ratio of nonresource revenues to NRGDP, 
r  is the elasticity of nonresource 
revenues with respect to the NROG, g is the ratio between expenditures and NRGDP, and 
g  
is the elasticity of expenditures with respect to the NROG.16 We call “fiscal impulse” an 
expansionary fiscal policy (i.e.,  0 canrpb ).  
 
To assess whether fiscal policy is countercyclical or procyclical, we have to examine the 
link between changes in the NROG and the change in canrpb. If the change in the NROG is 
negative (positive), then expansionary (contractionary) fiscal policy entails a countercyclical 
fiscal stance. Expansionary (contractionary) fiscal policy in the face of a positive (negative) 
change in the NROG implies a procyclical fiscal policy.17 
 
Using this methodology it is found that fiscal policy in LAC NRECs was predominantly 
procyclical during 2003-08.18 Figure 6 shows the change in the NROG and the fiscal impulses 
for each country during the period.19 The change in the NROG was positive in all countries and 
was particularly high in Venezuela. The fiscal impulses were positive in all countries except 
Bolivia. They were very substantial in Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. The 
combination of positive changes in NROGs with positive fiscal impulses implies a procyclical 
fiscal policy response. The degree of procyclicality (measured by the ratio of fiscal impulse to 
changes in the NROG) was relatively more pronounced in the case of Ecuador and Trinidad 
and Tobago (see Table 2). The degree of procyclicality can also be measured in Figure 6 as the 
slope of the ray from the origin to the point corresponding to each country. It can be seen that 
the slope of the rays is highest for Trinidad and Tobago and Ecuador. 
 
The degree of procyclicality of fiscal policy in our sample of LAC NRECs during the 
boom was lower on average than in a comparator sample of 13 middle-income NRECs outside 
the region.20 The median fiscal impulse normalized by the change in the NROG was 0.5 in LAC 
NRECs compared with 1.1 in the comparator group. This would seem to be explained in part by 
the fact that the average size of the resource sector and of resource revenues relative to GDP in 
                                                 
16 We assume that εr=1 and εg=0 for all countries. The approach assumes that no major tax policy changes 
took place. Most studies in developing countries assume that εg=0 mainly because of the absence of 
extended unemployment insurance schemes. We assume that εr=1 following Vladkova-Hollar and 
Zettelmeyer (2008) who estimate nonresource income elasticities controlling for changes in tax structure 
and find that they are close to unity in most cases. 
17 We follow Fedelino, Ivanova, and Horton (2009) in linking the change in canrpb (i.e., the fiscal impulse) 
to changes in the NROG to assess the cyclicality of the fiscal response. In contrast, Alberola and Montero 
(2006) study the link between fiscal impulses and the level of the output gap. We find the former 
approach more appealing, in part because the estimation of the direction of changes in output gaps is 
arguably more reliable than the estimation of the specific level of the output gap. 
18 In this paper, we follow the literature on the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy, which implicitly assumes 
that output shocks drive fiscal policy. However, some authors (e.g., Rigobon, 2004) claim that fiscal policy 
shocks drive output and not the other way around, suggesting that the conventional wisdom of procyclical 
fiscal policy in developing countries might not be well founded. These reverse causality considerations 
might be particularly relevant in some NRECs where nonresource economic activity is dominated by 
government spending. However, Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) rely on a battery of econometric tests to show 
that causality goes in both directions. In addition, they show that the evidence of procyclical fiscal policy 
in developing countries is robust to endogeneity considerations. 
19 We computed the cumulative change in the NROG and the cumulative fiscal impulse during 2003-08. 
20 The sample of countries comprises Algeria, Angola, Azerbaijan, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Indonesia, 
Iran, Kazakhstan, Libya, Russia, Sudan, and Timor Leste.   9
the comparator group is substantially higher than in LAC NRECs.21 Thus, in the comparator 
countries, the same proportional fiscal use of additional resource revenues would result, other 
things being equal, in a higher fiscal impulse relative to NRGDP because of the smaller size of 
the latter relative to windfall resource revenues. 
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Source: IMF data and national sources. 
 
In the 2009 downturn, the change in the NROG was negative in all countries except 
Bolivia and was particularly large in Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago (see Figure 7). The fiscal 
impulses were positive only in Chile and Peru, indicating the implementation of a 
countercyclical fiscal policy response in those countries. Fiscal policy was relatively neutral in 
Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago, procyclical in Ecuador, and highly procyclical in Venezuela. 
 
In the downturn, and in marked contrast to the boom, the degree of procyclicality in 
LAC NRECs was higher than in the comparator group of NRECs. The median fiscal impulse 
normalized by the change in the output gap was 0.1 compared to –1.2 in the other countries. 
Thus, the average fiscal response in the comparator countries was more countercyclical in the 
downturn. Government net financial positions are an important factor that may help explain 
the different fiscal responses. In LAC NRECs most governments were net financial debtors in 
2008 while most governments in the comparator countries were net financial creditors. This 
suggests that LAC NRECs had relatively less room for maneuver to implement expansionary 
fiscal policies than the comparator countries. 
 




















































Source: IMF data and national sources. 
 
                                                 
21 The average size of the resource sector in LAC NRECs is 16 percent of GDP compared to 43 percent in 
the comparator group. The average resource revenue-to-GDP ratio is 8 percent of GDP in LAC NRECs 
compared to 19 percent in the comparator group.   10
The evidence suggests that the procyclical fiscal policy bias was more prominent in the 
boom.22 Table 2 shows the degree of fiscal policy procyclicality during 2003-08 and in 2009. The 
average degree of procyclicality (measured by the ratio between the fiscal impulse and the 
change in the NROG) was 0.75 during the boom and –0.04 during 2009. 
 
Table 2. Fiscal Impulses and Nonresources Output Gaps (*). 
Bolivia -0.26 1.98 -0.13 -0.32 0.28 -1.12
Chile 2.63 6.18 0.43 4.62 -5.47 -0.84
Ecuador 12.34 8.26 1.49 -1.15 -2.66 0.43
Mexico 2.45 4.97 0.49 -0.05 -9.62 0.01
Peru 1.25 9.90 0.13 2.11 -5.09 -0.41
Trinidad and Tobago 20.94 9.34 2.24 -0.68 -9.34 0.07
Venezuela 19.77 31.48 0.63 -8.35 -5.34 1.56
2009 2003 - 2008
FI ΔNROG FI/ ΔNROG FI ΔNROG FI/ ΔNROG
Bolivia -0.26 1.98 -0.13 -0.32 0.28 -1.12
Chile 2.63 6.18 0.43 4.62 -5.47 -0.84
Ecuador 12.34 8.26 1.49 -1.15 -2.66 0.43
Mexico 2.45 4.97 0.49 -0.05 -9.62 0.01
Peru 1.25 9.90 0.13 2.11 -5.09 -0.41
Trinidad and Tobago 20.94 9.34 2.24 -0.68 -9.34 0.07
Venezuela 19.77 31.48 0.63 -8.35 -5.34 1.56
2009 2003 - 2008
FI ΔNROG FI/ ΔNROG FI ΔNROG FI/ ΔNROG
 
(*) FI: Fiscal impulse in percent of NRGDP. ΔNROG: Change in percent in NROG. 
Source: IMF data and national sources. 
 
The evidence also suggests that the countries that had more conservative fiscal policies 
during the boom tended to be those that implemented more expansionary fiscal policies during 
the slowdown in 2009.23 During the boom, fiscal policy was close to neutral in Peru and mildly 
procyclical in Chile; in both countries it was strongly countercyclical during the crisis. In 
Mexico, fiscal policy was mildly procyclical during the boom and relatively neutral during the 
crisis. Bolivia was a special case combining a mild countercyclical fiscal policy response during 
the boom and in 2009. In contrast, fiscal policy was procyclical in Ecuador, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Venezuela during the upswing and the downswing (except in Trinidad and Tobago 
where it was neutral in 2009).   
 
As will be seen in later sections, there are links between the degree of procyclicality 
during the boom and the current degree and/or dynamics of fiscal vulnerability and long-term 
fiscal sustainability. Broadly speaking, the fiscal positions of the countries that had the most 
procyclical responses to the boom are also those that are currently most exposed to resource 
price shocks and/or those whose sustainability may be in question. In contrast, the countries 
that pursued the least procyclical policies during the upswing currently enjoy relatively 
comfortable fiscal vulnerability and sustainability positions. In addition, it will be seen that 
there seems to have been no obvious link between the cyclical stance of fiscal policy and the 
presence of fiscal rules and/or resource funds across countries during the cycle.  
4  Short-Term Fiscal Vulnerability To Resource Price Shocks 
Resource price shocks are a fact of life for NRECs. The prices in real terms of copper, oil, 
and zinc experienced annual average (absolute) changes of around 20-25 percent during 1970-
2009. In turn, sharp declines in those prices have often led to sudden and painful fiscal 
adjustments and financing problems, as shown by many OECs in the mid-1980s and mid-
1990s. In addition, access to external credit markets has historically tended to be procyclical.24 
Even though a number of current projections suggest an upward path in resource prices over 
the medium term, the recent swings in resource prices (e.g., oil prices collapsed from a peak of 
almost US$150 per barrel in mid-2008 to US$35 per barrel in early-2009) provide a sobering 
reminder of potential price volatility. In addition, the still significant downside risks to the 
                                                 
22 This asymmetry of fiscal policy has been documented for a large sample of developing and advanced 
countries by Balassone and Kumar (2007). It could suggest that political economy factors that result in 
strong spending pressures in good times might have played a more important role than financing 
constraints in explaining the cyclical behavior of fiscal policy. 
23 Di Bella (2009) arrived to a similar conclusion in a larger sample of Latin American countries. 
24 Gavin and Perotti (1997) and Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004).   11
global recovery cannot be ignored. Against this background, it is important to examine the 
resilience of fiscal positions of LAC NRECs to potential resource price shocks. Have countries 
learnt from the past and reduced their fiscal vulnerability to those shocks?  
 
The analysis in the preceding section already provided some hints regarding the ability of 
the sample countries to respond to resource price shocks, as some countries had to undertake 
contractionary fiscal policies in 2009. This section carries out a more systematic and forward-
looking analysis by contrasting potential net/gross financing requirements resulting from 
resource price shocks against the financial asset stocks that governments accumulated in 
previous years.25 The results of this analysis are not clear a priori, as fiscal vulnerability could 
have increased during the last decade due to greater dependence on resource revenues in the 
region, larger nonresource deficits, and sizable overall fiscal deficits in the downturn.26 On the 
other hand, some countries accumulated sizable financial assets (and reduced debt) that could 
be tapped to smooth any needed adjustment to lower resource prices. Policy and institutional 
reforms may also have increased the resilience of countries to negative shocks.  
 
A simple way to assess the fiscal impact of a resource price shock is to assume local 
linearity between resource prices and fiscal revenue and, by extension, the overall fiscal 
balance and the gross financing requirement (i.e., the fiscal deficit plus amortizations due). To 
illustrate, this paper computes the impact of a hypothetical 15 percent fall in prices relative to 
the IMF-projected 2010 levels (in line with the median absolute change in prices over the last 
40 years or between the 3rd and 2nd quartile of the distribution of negative changes) and 
applies a proportional adjustment to the projected resource revenues and resource GDP for 
2010, while keeping nonresource revenue and spending unchanged (i.e., the same nonresource 
balance in nominal terms).27 
 
This approach helps isolate the specific impact of changes in resource prices, but has some 
drawbacks: it does not account for different effective rates of taxation across prices, and it 
abstracts from possible responses to lower resource prices (such as depreciation of the currency, 
increases in nonresource revenue, or reductions in government spending) or automatic declines 
in intergovernmental transfers arising from revenue-sharing provisions and in fuel subsidies.28 
Despite these shortcomings, this simple approach is useful to assess the fiscal impact of a 
resource price shock and the capacity of governments to manage it.   
 
Based on this methodology, the overall fiscal balance would fall more significantly in OECs 
than in MECs (see Table 3). The fiscal impact of a decline of 15 percent in mineral prices would 
be around 0.5 percent of GDP in Chile and Peru, while a similar decline in oil prices would 
have a fiscal impact of 3.5 percent of GDP in Venezuela. These results reflect the larger share 
of oil revenue in fiscal revenues and total GDP in OECs relative to mining revenue in MECs. 
More importantly, the average overall deficit in OECs would be close to the peak recorded in 
                                                 
25 This exercise may have become more relevant in the wake of the recent global financial crisis and the 
tightening of financing conditions, as it assumes that the estimated fiscal deficits and gross financing 
requirements must be financed out of the government’s financial assets and, by association, out of public 
sector external assets. This assumption, however, might be considered extreme for some countries with 
relatively developed domestic financial markets. 
26 Dependence on resource revenues in the sample countries increased on average from 20 percent of total 
fiscal revenue in 2003 to 26 percent in 2009. 
27 Projected 2010 fiscal figures were used in this exercise and in the next section to avoid making 
analytical assessments of fiscal vulnerability and long-term fiscal sustainability based on the unsettled 
conditions prevailing in 2009. 
28 Admittedly, an automatic reduction in shared resource revenue would just transfer the fiscal 
adjustment to other levels of government (e.g., Bolivia, Venezuela). However, the extent to which this is 
effective depends on the ability of the government to resist pressures for offsetting transfers and the 
ability of other beneficiary public entities to adjust to lower transfers.   12
2009 and gross financing requirements would average 11 percent of GDP in those countries. 
These values contrast greatly with those for Chile and Peru, where gross financing 
requirements would increase only to 3-4 percent of GDP. 
 
Table 3. Fiscal Impact of a 15 Percent Fall in Resource Prices. 
Change in Overall 
Balance in % of 
GDP
Implied Overall 




Requirement in % 
of GDP
Implied Overall 
Deficit in % of 
Gov. Financial 
Assets
Bolivia -1.64 -1.93 7.02 10.16
Chile -0.74 -2.37 4.21 15.09
Ecuador -1.16 -5.24 7.07 54.71
Mexico -1.11 -4.61 12.71 39.36
Peru -0.44 -0.79 3.43 8.85
Trinidad and Tobago -2.38 -6.58 12.91 36.70
Venezuela -3.61 -7.75 14.01 50.79
Change in Overall 
Balance in % of 
GDP
Implied Overall 




Requirement in % 
of GDP
Implied Overall 
Deficit in % of 
Gov. Financial 
Assets
Bolivia -1.64 -1.93 7.02 10.16
Chile -0.74 -2.37 4.21 15.09
Ecuador -1.16 -5.24 7.07 54.71
Mexico -1.11 -4.61 12.71 39.36
Peru -0.44 -0.79 3.43 8.85
Trinidad and Tobago -2.38 -6.58 12.91 36.70
Venezuela -3.61 -7.75 14.01 50.79  
Source: IMF staff estimates on the basis of projected 2010 IMF WEO Figures. 
  
Table 3 also shows the ratio of the overall fiscal deficits after the shock (and gross 
financing requirements) to gross government/NFPS domestic financial assets (i.e., deposits 
with the banking system) and government foreign assets.29  30 On this measure, Ecuador is 
highly exposed to resource price shocks, with net financing needs after the assumed shock 
representing 55 percent of available government financial assets, a fact exacerbated by its lack 
of access to international capital markets following its 2008 debt default. To a lesser extent, 
Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela would also be exposed to a resource price shock.31 
 
How has the short-term fiscal vulnerability to negative resource price shocks evolved 
during the last cycle? By undertaking a similar sensitivity analysis on the fiscal figures for 
2003—applying a 15 percent fall to resource prices prevailing that year—it is striking that 
fiscal exposure to resource price shocks has increased in Ecuador and Venezuela, as much 
larger fiscal deficits have not been offset by increases in government financial assets. Fiscal 
exposure to shocks fell substantially in Bolivia and Peru due to improvements in their overall 
fiscal balances and higher financial assets, and remains broadly unchanged in the other 
NRECs in LAC (see Table 4).  
 
The evidence shows links between procyclical fiscal policies during the boom and fiscal 
vulnerability. Broadly speaking, the fiscal positions of countries that implemented procyclical 
fiscal policies during the upswing tend to be those that are currently most exposed to resource 
price shocks and/or those whose exposure to shocks has increased.  
                                                 
29 In some countries, government deposits are the main counterpart of international reserves on the 
balance sheet of central banks. 
30 In Chile and Trinidad and Tobago savings in their resource funds are separate from the stock of 
international reserves held by the central bank. 
31 An extension, particularly relevant for the countries with fixed exchange rates regimes, is to measure 
the implied coverage of public external assets (i.e., central banks’ net international reserves plus resource 
funds) in terms of months of imports of goods and services. In Ecuador, this external vulnerability 
indicator would fall to below two months of imports.   13
Table 4. Evolution of Fiscal Vulnerability Indicators. 
2003 2010 2003 2010
Bolivia 105.9 10.2 7.2 19.0
Chile 9.2 15.1 8.0 8.0
Ecuador -2.5 54.7 1.4 1.6
Mexico 45.9 39.4 3.3 3.8
Peru 27.8 8.9 3.8 12.8
Trinidad and Tobago -3.1 36.7 6.4 16.3
Venezuela 39.5 50.8 15.5 10.1
Implied Overall Deficit in % of Gov. 
Financial Assets
Implied NIR + Resource Funds 
Coverage in Months of Imports
2003 2010 2003 2010
Bolivia 105.9 10.2 7.2 19.0
Chile 9.2 15.1 8.0 8.0
Ecuador -2.5 54.7 1.4 1.6
Mexico 45.9 39.4 3.3 3.8
Peru 27.8 8.9 3.8 12.8
Trinidad and Tobago -3.1 36.7 6.4 16.3
Venezuela 39.5 50.8 15.5 10.1
Implied Overall Deficit in % of Gov. 
Financial Assets
Implied NIR + Resource Funds 
Coverage in Months of Imports
 
Source: IMF staff estimates on the basis of projected 2010 IMF WEO figures. 
  
Finally, fiscal vulnerability exercises should be combined with assessments of the 
overall policy framework and its ability to help deal with negative shocks to resource prices and 
volumes. In this regard, reforms in the last two decades have made many of the countries in 
the sample more resilient to those shocks:32 
  The introduction of inflation targeting frameworks in Chile, Peru, and Mexico has 
strengthened the central bank’s mandate for maintaining low and stable inflation rates 
while increasing the flexibility of exchange rates to adapt to changes in external 
conditions.  
  Fiscal institutions have been reformed, with varied success, including through 
strengthened revenue administration, improvements in public financial management, 
reductions in budget rigidities, greater fiscal transparency, and the introduction of 
fiscal responsibility legislation, fiscal rules, and resource funds (section 6 and Appendix 
A provide an analysis of fiscal rules and resource funds for the countries in the sample).  
  The composition of public debt has changed dramatically in LAC NRECs, with the 
largest share now being denominated in local currency and with a longer average 
maturity. This said, Ecuador’s policy framework, for example, is less flexible to tackle 
potential financing shortfalls (in contrast to Mexico) due to the absence of monetary 
and exchange rate policies under its fully dollarized regime. 
5  Long-Term Fiscal Sustainability 
Some observers have argued that the sustainability of fiscal policies in the region has 
improved in the recent past. How did long-term fiscal sustainability in LAC NRECs evolve 
during the recent cycle? Are those developments linked to the degree of procyclicality of fiscal 
policy during the boom?  
 
Analyses of fiscal sustainability often focus on a comparison between the observed 
cyclically-adjusted primary balance against a debt-stabilizing primary balance. This approach 
is combined with a “reasonable” objective for the debt to GDP ratio.33 In NRECs, however, the 
analysis needs to take into account explicitly two critical issues: (i) the exhaustibility of 
resource revenues; and (ii) the existence of sizable financial asset stocks accumulated by some 
of those countries during the boom. The first issue is particularly relevant for the countries 
with a limited production horizon for existing resource reserves, like Mexico and Trinidad and 
                                                 
32 See IMF, Regional Economic Outlooks, various issues, and Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (2009) for a 
more thorough discussion. 
33 See for example Fernández-Arias and Montiel (2009) for a recent application to Latin American 
countries. Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano (2003) provide a discussion of debt “tolerance” in Latin 
America.   14
Tobago.34 On the other hand, a focus on gross debt is misleading for countries such as Trinidad 
and Tobago and Chile, which were able to turn part of their hydrocarbon/mineral wealth into 
financial assets during the boom.    
 
With these key considerations in mind, this paper assesses long-term fiscal sustainability 
by comparing the cyclically-adjusted NRPB (i.e., removing the impact of cyclical factors from 
the assessment of the actual fiscal policy stance) against a long-term or benchmark NRPB.  
 
The computation of the latter requires two steps: 
  First, the calculation of government net wealth, defined in this paper as the sum of the 
present value of projected future resource revenues (evaluated at the prices prevailing 
in the respective year of analysis—e.g., 2010 prices for the 2010 sustainability 
benchmark) plus net government financial assets. Estimating the present value of 
future resource revenue requires assumptions about future resource prices; resource 
reserves in the ground; production profiles; production costs; the government take; real 
interest rates and returns on financial assets; and the path of the real exchange rate 
(i.e., the domestic purchasing power of resource revenue).  
  Second, the derivation of a consumption (or spending) path out of government net 
wealth (i.e., the NRPB). This requires making intertemporal welfare choices regarding 
how much resource revenue to consume now versus how much to save for consumption 
by future generations. For this purpose, the literature has typically relied on 
alternative variants of the permanent income hypothesis (PIH) and consumption 
smoothing over time.35 The application of the PIH approach has usually involved the 
calculation of perpetuities, either constant in real terms or growing in line with 
population growth or the rate of growth of GDP.36 
  
These two steps are subject to uncertainty and face difficult issues regarding intertemporal 
welfare choices:  
  The estimation of the wealth from future resource revenue is complicated by 
uncertainty about many of the parameters mentioned above. This is especially the case 
for future resource prices, but there are other sources of uncertainty for the countries in 
the sample. For instance, Peru has a large mining potential (yet to be properly 
measured) but, on the other hand, some of its proven reserves might not be exploited at 
all because of social concerns (e.g., Río Blanco). 37 
  The intertemporal welfare choice regarding consumption and savings paths can be 
controversial, particularly in light of ever-expanding social needs. The implications of 
using a PIH-based approach or any other alternative are not trivial and lead to 
different consumption/savings paths, and therefore different intergenerational 
distribution of the resource wealth. 
 
                                                 
34 The ratio of proven reserves to production at the end of 2009 was less than 15 years for Mexico and 
Trinidad and Tobago, less than 40 years for Chile, Ecuador and Peru, and more than 50 years for Bolivia 
and Venezuela. 
35 Similar judgments about intertemporal welfare choices are made in the debt sustainability analysis 
(DSA) for other countries but are usually not made explicit. For example, the stabilization of the public 
debt in percent of GDP has major implications for the intertemporal allocation of taxes and public 
spending. See Barnett and Ossowski (2003) for a formal derivation, Maliszewski (2009) and van der 
Ploeg (2008) for comparative assessments, and Carcillo, Leigh, and Villafuerte (2007) for a specific 
application. 
36 See for example, Carcillo, Leigh, and Villafuerte (2007), Baunsgaard (2003), and Clausen (2008). 
37 Reserves, production profiles, and government takes can also change substantially over time with price 
changes, as documented by the literature on the so-called “expropriation cycles” (see for example Hogan 
and Sturzenegger, 2010).   15
Despite these caveats, fiscal sustainability exercises can be useful benchmarks for fiscal 
policy analysis and formulation in a longer term perspective when properly designed and with 
due consideration for the specific circumstances of each country.  
Furthermore, the benchmarks should be reassessed from time to time as new information 
becomes available. 
 
This paper computes a long-term fiscal benchmark based on a PIH formulation, but with 
an important difference relative to the traditional perpetuity-based approaches described 
above. These approaches are relatively stringent, as they require the stock of government 
wealth to increase over time through savings, including out of the return on financial 
investments. They would also not be realistic on policy grounds for countries with short 
resource production horizons and limited net financial assets, as spreading the consumption of 
oil-related wealth too far into the future would require large savings by current (probably 
poorer) generations. Instead, in this paper an annuity (at constant prices) is estimated on the 
basis of the total government wealth over the remaining production period (the reserves to 
production ratio in number of years) plus 15 years.38 This is an ad hoc formulation, but is less 
stringent than other approaches and more realistic for some countries in the sample. The long-
term annuity out of total government wealth is compared to the cyclically-adjusted NRPB as 
the relevant measure of its current consumption. Appendix D offers details about the 
methodology and assumptions used, as well as an illustrative simulation for a representative 
NREC.  
 
The comparative sustainability analysis over time and across countries in the sample can 
be facilitated by presenting the results in terms of the ratio of the implied long-term primary 
nonresource expenditure relative to the actual primary nonresource expenditure (this 
implicitly assumes an unchanged nonresource revenue ratio to NRGDP in the future). A “fiscal 
sustainability ratio” lower than 1 means that the country would have to adjust to reach the 
sustainable benchmark (for instance, if the ratio is 0.8, by an equivalent of 20 percent of the 
current level of expenditures), while a value greater than 1 would imply a sustainable fiscal 
position. The main results of this analysis are as follows (see Figure 8):  
  The IMF WEO-projected 2010 fiscal stance (the cyclically-adjusted NRPB), were it to be 
maintained unchanged into the future, would not be sustainable in the long run for 
Ecuador and Trinidad and Tobago; and sustainability questions would also emerge for 
Mexico and Venezuela. Potential “adjustments” would range from 25 percent of 
primary nonoil expenditure in Trinidad and Tobago to 10 percent in Mexico.39 By 
contrast, the fiscal position in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru would be more or less in line 
with the sustainability benchmark.40 41 
  When comparing the sustainability position in 2010 relative to 2003 (before the boom 
in resource prices), Ecuador, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela recorded substantial 
deteriorations, mainly because of a large expansion in their nonresource primary 
deficits relative to the increases in government net wealth. (Countries above the 45 
                                                 
38 This sustainability analysis has a “static” dimension in that it focuses on the fiscal position in one 
specific year at a time based on the information then available. A “sustainability gap” can be closed in 
subsequent years in various ways, including through higher nonresource revenue, reductions in spending, 
or changes in the fiscal regime of the resource sector. These factors can only be captured explicitly in a 
dynamic setting. 
39 As indicated earlier, domestic fuel subsidies, despite being sizable in several countries, were not 
included in the NRPB due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable estimates over time in several countries 
and different fiscal accounting treatment across countries. 
40 Under the perpetuity approach all countries were running unsustainable fiscal policies in 2010. 
41 This analysis assumes that domestic fuel subsidies are eliminated at some point in the future. 
Otherwise, the fiscal adjustment needed would be larger, and in some cases substantially so. For 
instance, in Ecuador these subsidies are estimated to have amounted to more than 8 percent of NRGDP 
in 2008.   16
degree line in Figure 8 improved their fiscal sustainability position between 2003 and 
2010, whereas countries below the line recorded a deterioration). These results are 
somewhat surprising given that between 2003 and 2010 the oil price more than doubled 
in real terms and proven reserves increased substantially in Ecuador and Venezuela. 
However, these factors were more than offset by the increased nonoil deficits, the 
reduced domestic purchasing power of higher oil revenue due to appreciations of the 
currency in real terms (particularly in Venezuela), and the reduced size of the oil 
wealth relative to a growing nonoil sector. By contrast, the long-term sustainability 
positions barely changed in Chile, Mexico, and Peru, and improved in Bolivia.  
  The countries whose fiscal responses to the boom were most procyclical are also those 
that currently show the weakest long-term fiscal sustainability positions and/or those 
where fiscal sustainability deteriorated during the cycle. 
 
























































Source: IMF staff estimates. 
 
Finally, it is worth stressing that long-term unsustainable positions do not necessarily 
imply the need for immediate adjustment, although the issue may be more pressing for 
countries with short remaining production horizons. Fiscal sustainability assessments have to 
be updated from time to time, given that the estimation of long-term sustainability 
benchmarks is subject to considerable uncertainty. In addition, governments could reap 
sufficient fiscal dividends (through higher nonresource revenue) from higher government 
spending to keep their 2010 levels (in percent of NRGDP, for example). However, the latter will 
depend on the quality of government spending, its impact on economywide productivity levels, 
and the government’s ability to reap fiscal dividends from the additional activity—as well as on 
the quality of overall policies, institutions, and decision making. 
6  Fiscal Rules And Resource Funds During The Cycle 
Most NRECs in the region have introduced numerical fiscal rules or fiscal guidelines and/or 
nonrenewable resource funds (NRFs) in the expectation that these institutional features may 
help address the challenges that uncertain, volatile, and exhaustible resource revenues pose to 
fiscal management.42 In many cases, fiscal rules and funds have also been motivated by 
political economy considerations: they have been seen as potentially useful instruments to 
contain spending pressures or to enhance the government’s credibility. 
 
This section looks at the role played by these mechanisms during the recent cycle. There 
has been a wide variety of fiscal rules and funds among NRECs in the region: what are their 
                                                 
42 Fiscal rules are defined here as standing commitments to specified numerical targets for some key 
budget aggregates. Unlike fiscal rules, fiscal guidelines are not legally binding. This is the case in Chile. 
In what follows, however, for simplicity reference will be made to Chile’s “fiscal rule”.   17
main characteristics, and what was their implementation experience during the boom and the 
slump? Were there links between the presence of rules or funds and the fiscal responses to the 
cycle? The section also offers some suggestions for the design of these mechanisms in NRECs 
based on conceptual considerations and lessons from country experiences. 
 
Six of the seven countries covered in this study have, or have had at some point during the 
last decade, one or both of these mechanisms: fiscal rules and NRFs (Chile, Ecuador, Mexico, 
and Venezuela); fiscal rules (Peru); and NRFs (Trinidad and Tobago). Bolivia is the only 
country in the group not to have put in place such mechanisms. The design and 
implementation experience of rules and funds in the NRECs in the region are discussed in 
detail in Appendix A.  
 
The design of fiscal rules and NRFs has varied widely among the sample countries: 
  Chile: fiscal rule (2001) targeting the structural central government balance (which 
comes close to targeting the cyclically-adjusted nonresource balance given the 
adjustment made for the price of copper), which underwent successive technical 
refinements over time and was relaxed twice; and a price-contingent copper 
stabilization fund that was later replaced by two NRFs: a fund with flexible rules 
where overall fiscal surpluses are deposited and from which resources can be drawn if 
desired, and a fund with a pre-specified range for annual deposits as a ratio to GDP.43 
  Ecuador: originally three fiscal rules (2002) targeting the nonresource balance, the rate 
of growth of expenditure in real terms, and the public debt, which were modified (some 
expenditures were excluded from the coverage of the spending rule) and subsequently 
replaced by a nonoil golden rule (2008); and a series of NRFs which had various 
operational rules—including trigger rules contingent on actual oil prices relative to 
budgeted prices, and rigid deposit rules. The last of these NRFs was abolished a few 
years ago. 
  Mexico: fiscal rule (2006) targeting the overall budget balance; and NRFs with trigger 
rules contingent on actual oil prices relative to budgeted prices. Both underwent 
modifications: some expenditures were excluded from the coverage of the rule, and 
subsequently the rule was temporarily relaxed; the caps on the accumulated resources 
in some of the funds were suspended. 
  Peru: fiscal rules (1999) targeting the overall balance and the rate of growth of 
expenditure in real terms, which were modified several times: the fiscal balance targets 
and expenditure growth ceilings were relaxed, and some expenditures were removed 
from the coverage of the spending rule. 
  Trinidad and Tobago: NRFs with trigger rules contingent on actual oil revenues 
relative to budgeted revenues. 
  Venezuela: multi-year fiscal rules (2000) targeting the current balance, the rate of 
growth of expenditure in real terms, and the public debt (which have not been 
implemented); and a NRF with oil price trigger rules which were frequently modified as 
circumstances and policy objectives changed. 
 
On the whole, and mirroring developments with fiscal rules and funds in NRECs elsewhere 
in the world, the experience of LAC NRECs with these mechanisms has been mixed.44 There 
                                                 
43 Most nonrenewable resource stabilization funds around the world have rigid price- or revenue-
contingent deposit and withdrawal rules, whereby deposits and withdrawals depend on the realization of 
an outcome (resource price or revenue) relative to a specified trigger. In contrast, most savings funds have 
rigid non-contingent deposit rules which typically require the annual deposit of a fixed share of revenues 
into the fund. Finally, some financing funds have flexible operational mechanisms more closely aligned 
with overall balances. 
44 For a general review of international experience with fiscal rules and NRFs in NRECs and econometric 
analysis of their effectiveness, see Ossowski and others (2008). Bacon and Tordo (2006) provide a detailed   18
seems to have been no obvious link between the presence of fiscal rules and NRFs and the 
cyclicality of fiscal policy across LAC NRECs during the recent cycle: 
  In Chile (fiscal rule and NRFs) and Peru (fiscal rules) fiscal policies were—at most—
moderately procyclical during the boom, and countercyclical during the slump.  
  Bolivia conducted fiscal policies broadly similar to those of the countries above without 
these mechanisms. 
  In Mexico (fiscal rule and NRFs), the degree of procyclicality of fiscal policy increased 
following the establishment of the rule and the funds in the latter part of the boom, and 
policy was neutral in the downswing. 
  Ecuador (fiscal rules and NRFs), Venezuela (fiscal rules and NRFs) and Trinidad and 
Tobago (NRFs) conducted the most procyclical fiscal policies during the boom, and their 
policies were also procyclical or neutral during the slump. 
 
In other words, fiscal rules and NRFs were associated with a broad range of fiscal 
responses to the recent economic and resource price cycles, including highly procyclical 
responses. In part, this is the result of the many modifications that rules and funds underwent 
in many countries as circumstances and policy objectives changed (see below and Appendix 
A).45  This said, in some countries these mechanisms may have had some disciplining and 
credibility-enhancing effects. For instance, in Peru the expenditure rule, while undergoing 
several modifications, seems to have helped anchor the fiscal policy formulation process and 
moderate procyclicality. These effects are difficult to test empirically, however, particularly 
when the rules and funds have been in place for just a few years in a context where the 
external environment and many other factors were also changing—dramatically in some cases.   
 
Many factors could potentially explain the variety of outcomes with rules and funds. They 
range from design issues to institutional and political economy aspects, such as political 
support and commitment to the rule or fund, consensus, fiscal transparency, sound public 
financial management and adequate monitoring and control. Although a detailed examination 
of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, the next subsections highlight some critical 
lessons arising from the working of fiscal rules and funds in LAC NRECs. 
6.1  Fiscal rules 
In consonance with the experience of NRECs in other regions, it has been difficult to 
design and implement fiscal rules in LAC NRECs that can withstand the volatility and 
uncertainty of nonrenewable resource revenues and the rapidly changing economic 
environments facing these countries—particularly in countries that are more heavily 
dependent on resource revenues, namely the OECs in the sample.  
 
During the boom and in a situation of abundant liquidity generated by resource 
revenues, a number of rules targeting the nonresource balance and the rate of growth of 
expenditure were tested by mounting expenditure pressures. These pressures may have been 
based in part on growing perceptions as time went by that the resource price increases were 
“permanent.” As a result, the rules were changed over time, sometimes several times (Ecuador, 
Peru), were not complied with (Ecuador), or were not implemented (Venezuela). The Chilean 
structural balance rule, while undergoing technical modifications over time, was met 
throughout the period in a situation of strong consensus and political support for the rule, but 
was eased in the last year of the boom. Rules targeting the overall balance, on the other hand, 
                                                                                                                                                     
operational review of many oil funds. Arezki and Ismail (2010) evaluated econometrically some aspects of 
the effectiveness of fiscal rules in OECs, and Shabsigh and Ilahi (2007) of oil funds. 
45 An analysis of the link between the presence of fiscal rules and/or NRFs in OECs around the world and 
the degree of fiscal policy procyclicality during the recent oil price cycle based on Villafuerte and López-
Murphy (2010) does not show statistically significant differences in the fiscal policy responses of countries 
with such mechanisms and countries without them.   19
were more easily met, particularly as the increase in resource prices accelerated during the 
latter years of the boom (Peru). But they also implied or allowed procyclical fiscal policies 
(Mexico). In Peru the expenditure rule seems to have provided a more binding constraint 
during the upswing. 
 
As resource prices fell precipitously and recession set in in a number of LAC NRECs, 
rules targeting the overall balance came under pressure and were modified or suspended 
invoking exceptional clauses (Mexico and Peru; in Peru the spending rule was also eased to 
undertake a countercyclical fiscal response). In Chile, the structural balance rule was relaxed 
further, and methodological changes of various types introduced, to accommodate an easing of 
fiscal policy. 
 
The frequent changes to fiscal rules and compliance difficulties in most LAC NRECs 
during the recent economic cycle highlight the complex design, implementation, and political 
economy issues associated with the volatility and unpredictability of nonrenewable resource 
revenues, and the difficult tradeoffs between rigidity, flexibility, and credibility in the design of 
rules. Rigid rules can be easily overcome by events, undermining their credibility.  Excessive 
flexibility can increase uncertainty about the direction of fiscal policy.  
 
The experience of LAC NRECs with fiscal rules suggests a number of lessons for 
successful strategies that are consistent with those emanating from NRECs in other regions 
(Ter-Minassian, 2010).  
  Targeting the overall balance in NRECs on its own is procyclical (e.g., Mexico) and can 
result in major swings in expenditure (which is made hostage to the vagaries of 
resource prices). Targeting nonresource balances (adjusted for the nonresource cycle if 
technically and institutionally feasible) or alternative structural balances as in Chile 
(supplemented by some feedback loop from the debt or the overall deficit if the initial 
fiscal or financial position is precarious) can help smooth spending, decouple it from 
resource revenues in the short run, and reduce procyclicality, provided other 
preconditions listed below are met, as illustrated by the different experiences of Chile 
and Ecuador. The appropriate level of the targeted nonresource balance has to take 
into account long-term fiscal sustainability and fiscal vulnerability to resource shocks. 
  Some flexibility in the design of fiscal rules, as well as escape clauses, are advisable in 
NRECs that face large uncertainties about relevant macroeconomic factors (including 
resource prices) and are heavily exposed to unpredictable exogenous shocks. This would 
help reduce the likelihood of ad-hoc modifications to the rules or their suspension (e.g., 
Chile, Mexico, Peru). As regards flexibility, the targets could be specified for a period of 
a few years and periodic revisions based on medium- and long-term reassessments 
undertaken; or revision clauses could be introduced specifying the conditions under 
which the targets may be revised; or rolling targets could be used—though this may 
weaken discipline and carry credibility costs if used inappropriately. In all cases, 
transparent, clear and specific escape clauses for unpredictable and major shocks 
should be put in place. 
  Other key technical elements and preconditions for a successful strategy include added 
emphasis on a medium-term perspective, a minimum set of public financial 
management requirements, and fiscal transparency. 
  Consensus and political commitment to the rules are vital for their success. Rules that 
are not buttressed by broad social and political agreement over their objectives are 
unlikely to be effectively implemented and in cases of major political volatility can 
easily end up being ignored (e.g., Ecuador, Venezuela).   20
6.2  Nonrenewable resource funds 
Almost all the funds put in place by NRECs in the region have (or have had) rigid 
(contingent or non-contingent) accumulation and withdrawal rules—the recent Social and 
Economic Stabilization Fund in Chile being the notable exception. The implementation of funds 
with rigid rules was premised largely on the expectation that the removal of “high” resource 
revenues relative to some benchmark or of a fixed share of revenues from the budget would 
help moderate and stabilize public spending, reduce the room for discretion in fiscal policy, and 
foster savings. 
 
In practice setting fixed trigger resource prices or revenues in contingent NRFs has 
proved difficult, owing to the characteristics of the stochastic process generating these prices. 
Given the large resource price volatility, uncertainty, and shock persistence, it is very 
challenging to set estimated long-term average prices that are supposed to remain unchanged 
over time. As a result, funds with such trigger rules either had their rules modified frequently 
and their operations temporarily suspended (Venezuela), or after undergoing modifications of 
the trigger rules were replaced by funds with different rules (Chile, copper stabilization fund), 
or were eliminated (Ecuador). Some funds where deposits and withdrawals are contingent on 
realized resource prices or revenues relative to the prices or revenues set in the budget have 
proved more resilient (Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago) but in certain circumstances can 
complicate asset and liability management and, if the budgeted resource revenue or price is not 
set by formula, can provide incentives for the strategic setting of resource prices or revenues in 
the budget. The fund in Ecuador where deposits were based on a fixed share of certain oil 
revenues was abolished after a few years of operation. 
 
The experience with NRFs in countries in the region also shows that tensions can easily 
surface between rigid-rule NRFs and overall fiscal policy and asset management. For example, 
in Venezuela, given the overall stance of fiscal policy, at times the required deposits into the 
N R F  c o u l d  o n l y  b e  m a d e  b y  i s s u i n g  d e b t  a t  h i g h  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s ;  t h i s  l e d  t o  t e m p o r a r y  
suspensions of the operations of the fund. In Ecuador, the combination of rigid deposit rules 
into the NRF, extensive revenue earmarking, and cash fragmentation led to the 
implementation of schemes to bypass the restrictions placed by the NRF, including the 
domestic placement of debt subsequently “bought-back” by the NRF.  
 
In most NRECs in the region that have or have had NRFs with rigid operational rules, 
these operate in conjunction with fiscal rules (Trinidad and Tobago being the exception). When 
overall fiscal policy is constrained by fiscal rules, the rationale for funds with separate rigid 
operational rules is unclear. And this set up may lead to conflicting objectives, thereby 
complicating asset and liability management, as shown for instance by Ecuador. Rather, if 
there is a desire for a NRF, the existence of a fiscal rule would argue for establishing a 
financing fund with flexible accumulation and withdrawal rules and clear asset management 
objectives, which would ensure its effective integration with the budget.  
 
As noted above, it has been argued that NRFs with rigid operational rules contribute to 
the moderation of spending because they remove certain resources from the budget during 
upswings. It is useful to disentangle the technical and political economy aspects of the issue: 
  At a purely technical level, this would be the case if there are strong liquidity 
constraints and the NRF rules are binding and they are observed. However, if the 
government is running large surpluses, it is not clear why removing some resources 
from the budget would moderate spending. And in the absence of surpluses, since 
resources are fungible, the government can borrow or run down other financial assets 
to increase spending and make the required deposits in the NRF – or it can ignore the 
NRF rules.    21
  This still leaves possible political economy arguments for rigid NRF rules: even if there 
are no liquidity constraints, rules that mandate deposits into a fund can influence the 
political process in the direction of moderating spending. The evidence suggests, 
however, that the political economy advantages of removing resources from the budget 
are often unclear, that when pressures are mounting the funds’ rules can be changed, 
bypassed, or ignored, and that the results seem to be very country-specific.  
  On the other hand, rigid NRF rules can have significant fiscal costs in terms of 
suboptimal asset and liability management, as illustrated by the examples cited above. 
 
The evidence of a number of LAC NRECs therefore suggests that the focus should be on 
overall fiscal policy; that NRFs with rigid operational rules (such as those in Ecuador, Mexico, 
and Venezuela) would best be avoided; and that if there is a preference for having a NRF, 
consideration should be given to financing funds with flexible rules that are well integrated 
with budget systems and fiscal policy frameworks (e.g., the Social and Economic Stabilization 
Fund in Chile). 
 
Some countries have made efforts in the last few years to better integrate their NRFs with 
budget systems and fiscal policy frameworks. Chile replaced its rigid-rule contingent fund with 
a flexible-rule stabilization and savings fund where overall fiscal surpluses are deposited and 
from which deficits can be financed. The usefulness of such a fund was shown in 2009 when the 
deficit was largely financed by drawings from the fund. Mexico suspended temporarily the 
statutory caps on the resources held in some of its NRFs, which had been a source of 
procyclicality and inefficiency (as resources accumulated in excess of the caps were earmarked 
for extrabudgetary expenditures, and these expenditures did not compete for resources with 
spending included in the budget). 
7  Conclusions 
This paper examined several dimensions of fiscal policy in NRECs in LAC during the last 
decade, including the fiscal stance of these countries from a short-run stabilization perspective; 
their short-term fiscal vulnerability to sudden falls in resource prices; and the long-term 
sustainability of their fiscal policy stance. The paper then looked at the role played by fiscal 
rules and resource funds and their relative performance with regard to these various 
dimensions of fiscal policy. 
 
Fiscal policy was found to be predominantly procyclical in LAC NRECs during the boom, 
as most countries, particularly Ecuador and Trinidad and Tobago, relaxed their fiscal policies 
during the upswing. In the 2009 downturn, the differences in the fiscal policy stance were more 
marked across these countries, with a countercyclical policy in Bolivia, Chile, and Peru, a 
neutral one in Mexico and Trinidad and Tobago, and procyclical in Ecuador and Venezuela. 
The evidence also suggests that procyclicality was, on average, more prominent during the 
boom years. The non-uniform responses to the slump can be partly linked to the fiscal policy 
stance during the boom: countries displaying more conservative fiscal policies in 2003-08 
implemented more expansionary fiscal policies, on average, during the 2009 crisis. 
 
The paper found links between the degree of procyclicality during the boom and the 
current degree and/or dynamics of fiscal vulnerability and long-term fiscal sustainability. 
Broadly speaking, the countries that had the most procyclical responses to the boom are also 
those whose fiscal positions are currently most vulnerable to resource price shocks and/or those 
whose sustainability may be in question. In contrast, the countries that pursued the least 
procyclical fiscal policies during the upswing currently enjoy relatively comfortable fiscal 
vulnerability and sustainability positions.  
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In terms of short-term fiscal vulnerability to resource price shocks, the analysis suggests 
that Ecuador, and to a lesser extent Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela, would be 
affected more strongly by such shocks. When examining the evolution of fiscal vulnerability 
positions during the recent cycle, Bolivia and Peru reduced them substantially, while the fiscal 
exposure to resource price shocks of Ecuador and Venezuela increased. The analysis also 
indicates that the current fiscal positions of Ecuador, Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Venezuela, if maintained into the future, would pose challenges to long-term sustainability.  
 
The empirical analysis in this paper would allow to classify LAC NRECs into groups 
according to the fiscal policies implemented during the last decade. Fiscal policies in Bolivia, 
Chile, and Peru played a more stabilizing role during the cycle while becoming more 
sustainable in the short- and long-terms. In contrast, fiscal policies in Ecuador, Trinidad and 
Tobago, and Venezuela were mostly procyclical (and sometimes highly so), contributing to a 
deterioration in their (short- and long-term) sustainability positions. Mexico ran mildly 
procyclical policies during the boom and faces long-term sustainability challenges, but was able 
to keep its fiscal vulnerability and long-term sustainability positions broadly unchanged over 
time. 
  
Most NRECs in the region have put in place fiscal rules and/or NRFs in response to the 
difficult challenges brought about by fiscal dependence on volatile, uncertain, and exhaustible 
resources. The experience of LAC NRECs with fiscal rules and NRFs has been mixed, 
mirroring developments in NRECs elsewhere in the world. The evidence suggests no obvious 
link between the presence of fiscal rules and NRFs and the cyclicality of fiscal policy across 
LAC NRECs during the recent cycle. Indeed, rules and NRFs were associated with a broad 
range of fiscal responses, including highly procyclical responses. In part, this reflects frequent 
modifications introduced to them in a number of countries as circumstances and policy 
objectives changed. In some other countries, by contrast, fiscal rules and NRFs seem to have 
had some disciplining and credibility-enhancing effects. 
 
The design and implementation of fiscal rules and NRFs in NRECs is very challenging 
owing to the volatility and uncertainty of nonrenewable resource revenues, the rapidly 
changing economic conditions, and the need for supportive political and institutional 
environments. The lessons extracted from the region suggest some key elements for successful 
strategies. As regards fiscal rules: targeting nonresource balances (adjusted for the 
nonresource cycle, or alternative structural balances as in Chile, if feasible); some flexibility in 
the design of fiscal rules, including clear mechanisms for the modification of targets based on 
medium- and long-term reassessments if appropriate; an enhanced medium-term perspective 
for fiscal policy; transparent, clear and specific escape clauses; a minimum set of public 
financial management requirements; fiscal transparency; and strong political support for the 
rules. As regards NRFs: rigid operational rules would preferably be avoided; and funds should 
be well integrated with budget systems and fiscal policy frameworks. 
















FISCAL  RULES AND RESOURCE  FUNDS IN LAC  NONRENEWABLE  RESOURCE 
EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
 
CHILE (STRUCTURAL BALANCE RULE AND RESOURCE FUNDS) 
Since 2001, Chile’s fiscal policy has been built on the concept of a central government 
structural balance. This framework has been intended to signal fiscal policy intentions, while 
limiting procyclical policies and allowing full operation of automatic stabilizers from the 
revenue side. Under the structural balance rule, government expenditures are ex-ante 
budgeted in line with estimated structural revenues, i.e., revenues that would be achieved if 
the economy were operating at full potential and the prices of copper and molybdenum were at 
their long-term levels.  The expenditure envelope is in turn split into an “inertial” component 
(i.e., legal and contractual obligations, multi-year commitments, and operating expenses) and a 
fraction for the creation of new spending programs or the expansion of existing ones. However, 
the authorities have also aimed at meeting the structural balance targets ex-post by 
undertaking any needed (intra-yearly revenue and expenditure) adjustments during budgetary 
execution.     
 
Compliance with structural balance targets in Chile is not legally binding. However, 
successive governments reiterated their commitment with set targets and mostly complied 
with them. The 2006 Fiscal Responsibility Law (FRL) institutionalized key aspects of the 
structural balance rule framework (without forcing the government to commit to a specific 
target nor specifying procedures for its calculation) and complemented the fiscal framework 
with the introduction of two funds (the Social and Economic Stabilization Fund and the 
Pension Reserve Fund).  
 
In clear contrast to other countries in the region, most fiscal powers in Chile are vested 
in the President and the executive branch (IMF, 2003). This means that the structural balance 
rule mainly acts as a constraint self-imposed and self-assessed by the executive. In this 
context, changes to this fiscal framework have been introduced through policy papers issued by 
the Budget Office (DIPRES), including the migration of accounting standards to the 2001 IMF 
Government Financial Statistics Manual, an expansion in its institutional coverage (to the 
consolidated central government, i.e., including extrabudgetary transactions from the Ley 
Reservada del Cobre), and changes in the numerical targets. 
 
The structural balance target has changed over time. It was originally set at a surplus 
of 1 percent of GDP based on three grounds: (i) the structural operating deficit and negative 
net worth of the Central Bank of Chile; (ii) the existence of contingent liabilities related 
primarily to state-guaranteed minimum pensions and old-age benefits; and, (iii) external 
vulnerabilities arising from currency mismatches in the public sector balance sheet. 
Interestingly, and according to DIPRES (2006), such a target was more or less in line with the 
fiscal outcomes recorded during most of the 1990s. In 2008, the target was reduced to a 0.5 
percent of GDP surplus because of an improvement in underlying macrofiscal conditions, the 
reduction in fiscal risks, and the accumulation of financial savings. In 2009, the target was 
reduced further to balance to accommodate a countercyclical fiscal policy package in the 
context of the global financial crisis and the sharp reduction in economic activity. Furthermore, 
the 2009 target was defined to exclude the impact of temporary tax reduction measures 
(amounting to about 1.5 percent of GDP). 
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The implementation of the structural balance rule has been supported by two 
independent panels of experts to determine potential output and the long-term price of copper. 
Each year, the Finance Ministry assembles two independent panels of 11-15 individuals who 
are widely regarded as experts in their fields. The Finance Ministry asks the copper price panel 
to provide a ten-year forecast of copper prices and the reference price is then set as the 
arithmetic average of the forecasts (excluding two most extreme estimates). From the potential 
output panel, the ministry requests 5-6 year growth forecasts for: (i) labor force: (ii) real 
investment; and (iii) total factor productivity. Officials have to date computed average forecasts 
and use HP-filtered series to estimate trend GDP and the output gap from an aggregate Cobb-
Douglas production function. More recently, GDP elasticities disaggregated for 5 types of taxes 
have been used to derive the structural nonmining revenue. 
 
The structural balance rule framework in Chile has been a critical cornerstone for 
Chile’s strong fiscal performance during the recent economic cycle. In particular, the use of 
long-term copper prices limited the impact of highly volatile copper prices during the boom 
years (prices quadrupled between 2003 and 2008) and in 2009 (a 25 percent fall in prices; see 
Figure A1). In fact, the long-term copper price was more or less equivalent to averaging 
copper prices for rolling 10-year periods (with a correlation of 0.92 between 2003 and 2009). 
Primary expenditure in real terms grew by an average of 7.5 percent in 2004-08, highly 
correlated to the increase in copper prices but still relatively limited. By contrast, primary 
expenditure in real terms grew by 18 percent in the recessionary year of 2009 thanks to a 
drawdown of part of the large financial assets previously accrued in the Social and Economic 
Stabilization Fund.   
 
The success of the rule can be explained in part by the existence of a strong 
institutional framework, which includes a concentration of fiscal powers in the executive, and 
an effective inflation-targeting framework. At the same time, issues surrounding the 
implementation of the rule in 2009-10, such as the ad-hoc exclusion of temporary tax 
reductions from the target, have brought to the fore some challenges in its functioning. The 
framework might have become unduly complex over time (with reduced transparency) and 
rigid. In this context, in May 2010 the authorities established an advisory committee tasked 
with reviewing the workings of the framework, suggesting ways to improve and simplify its 
methodologies, and increasing its transparency and accountability. A first report by the 
committee, which was aimed at providing temporary recommendations to guide the 
formulation of the 2011 budget, suggested changes in the use of inputs from the potential 
output independent panel, not to exclude temporary tax reductions from the calculation of the 
structural target, to eliminate the cyclical correction on the return on accrued financial assets, 
and to revert some accounting practices that were understating the headline and structural 
deficits. The final report of the committee is expected to provide broader advice on the fiscal 
rule that would be put in place starting in 2012. 
 


























Source: IMF World Economic Outlook database and Chilean authorities. 
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ECUADOR (FISCAL RULES AND OIL FUNDS) 
Dependence on oil revenues in a context of lack of political consensus and institutional 
weaknesses has complicated fiscal policy in Ecuador. The country has suffered from recurrent 
problems in reaching sustainable agreements regarding fiscal policy. This is reflected in the 
introduction of frequent legal reforms, some short-lived, in the fiscal framework. An important 
factor behind this instability is lack of trust among various groups involved in the fiscal policy 
process, which is also reflected in extensive revenue earmarking and budget rigidities. The 
high degree of budget rigidity, in turn, generated frequent liquidity problems and contributed 
to the procyclicality of fiscal policy.  
 
In 2000, shortly after dollarization, an oil stabilization fund (FEP) was created. The 
fund was to receive 45 percent of all oil revenue in excess of oil revenue projected in the budget. 
The remainder was earmarked to regional projects and some investments. In subsequent years, 
the FEP accumulated limited resources, and did not seem to have any noticeable impact on the 
conduct of fiscal policy. 
 
An important attempt to strengthen the fiscal framework and provide greater clarity in 
the conduct of fiscal policy was made in 2002. That year, a Fiscal Responsibility and 
Transparency Law (FRTL) were adopted. The law included numerical fiscal rules for the 
central government, procedural budgetary rules, and the creation of a new oil fund (FEIREP). 
There were three fiscal rules: a limit on the annual growth of primary expenditure in real 
terms (3.5 percent); a requirement to reduce the nonoil fiscal deficit by at least 0.2 percentage 
points of GDP a year down to zero; and a requirement to steadily reduce the public debt ratio 
until it reached at most 40 percent of GDP. The new oil fund was to receive all the oil revenue 
arising from the operation of the new heavy crude pipeline (OCP). Its resources were 
earmarked to debt reduction in excess of regularly scheduled amortization (70 percent); 
stabilization of the budget and to cover expenditures arising from natural disasters and 
economic emergencies (20 percent); and health and education spending (which was included in 
the 3.5 percent spending rule; 10 percent). 
 
As oil revenues increased, governments had growing difficulties in withstanding 
pressures for more public spending and resisting questionable policy initiatives from powerful 
interest groups and local governments. Thus, as financing constraints lifted, revenues 
increased, and spending pressures mounted, the implementation of some of the fiscal rules 
deteriorated over time. Furthermore, the 3.5 percent cap on the growth of primary spending in 
real terms in the presence of extensive revenue earmarking was bound to reduce even further 
the already limited fiscal flexibility of the central government. The latter steadily deteriorated 
over time as revenue-sharing transfers and other revenue earmarking increasingly squeezed 
out discretionary spending. To avoid this effect, it would have been essential to reduce 
earmarking significantly. However, attempts to pass fiscal reforms through congress, including 
reductions in earmarking, proved unsuccessful. 
 
The situation was not helped by the existence of certain ambiguities in the FRTL. 
Notably, the legislation did not specify whether the basis for comparison for the spending and 
deficit rules was to be the approved budget or the executed budget of the previous fiscal year. 
This generated incentives to use the most convenient definition depending on the 
circumstances – and still, the nonoil deficit reduction rule was frequently not observed. 
Invoking economic emergencies also became common, to allow the use of FEIREP resources to 
increase spending. In addition, the central government resorted to placing debt domestically 
that was later “bought-back” through FEIREP (as a creative asset-liability management 
approach). In the event, FEIREP only managed to accumulate limited balances. 
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The fiscal policy framework was changed and weakened in 2005. Congress approved a 
reform to the FRTL, sponsored by a new government, that removed capital spending from the 
spending rule, eliminated the FEIREP oil fund and brought all oil revenues into the budget, 
and increased the earmarking of oil revenues, thus exacerbating budget rigidities. 
 
Further changes were introduced in 2008. The Constitutional Assembly abolished all 
existing oil funds and fiscal rules, which were replaced by a new rule. The rule stipulates that 
current spending can only be financed by nonoil revenue (a sort of “nonoil golden rule”). 
Arguably, these changes were simply the final result of a gradual and sustained weakening of 
political support to the fiscal rule and oil funds. The new nonoil golden rule seems to have 
provided incentives for creative accounting and reclassification of spending. In 2008, recorded 
capital spending more than doubled. 
 
To summarize, the success of fiscal rules and oil funds in Ecuador was very limited. 
Rules and the operating mechanisms of funds were repeatedly changed or simply ignored. The 
fiscal rules did not withstand strong spending pressures during the boom. The oil funds became 
largely additional earmarking mechanisms that increased budget rigidities and complicated 
fiscal management. 
 
MEXICO (FISCAL RULE AND OIL FUNDS) 
Mexico implemented an oil stabilization fund in 2000. A part of government revenues in 
excess of budgeted amounts was to be transferred to the fund. At first, fund resources could 
only be used if oil export revenues fell by more than US$1.5 a barrel below the reference oil 
price in the budget. In 2002, however, the rules were changed to allow for full compensation of 
shortfalls. During that year the fund’s accumulated resources were fully drawn. 
 
Major changes in the fiscal framework were introduced in 2006 with the adoption of the 
Federal Budget and Fiscal Responsibility Law. The law established a fiscal balance target, 
mechanisms for budgeting under oil price uncertainty, a system of oil funds, and a medium-
term expenditure framework. 
 
A Balanced Budget Rule applies to the budgetary federal public sector, which consists 
of the federal government, the social security systems, and some public enterprises including 
PEMEX, the national oil company. Under the rule, budgets must target a zero balance on a 
cash basis. In exceptional circumstances a weaker budget may be proposed, but this requires 
explicit justification and plans for returning to zero balance. The law requires the government 
to present the annual budget in the context of a medium-term framework with projections 
covering the subsequent five years. 
 
Federal oil revenues for each annual budget are projected using a reference oil price. 
The price is set by a formula, with a weight of 0.75 being given to oil futures prices and a 
weight of 0.25 to the average oil price of the last ten years. Any excess revenue that results 
from oil prices being higher than the reference price may first be used to compensate for 
certain specified budget overruns. The remainder is split between three first tier oil funds (90 
percent) and state-level investments (10 percent). The first tier oil funds are a stabilization 
fund and funds to finance PEMEX investment and investment by federal entities. If actual oil 
revenues turn out to be lower than budgeted due to lower oil prices or exchange rate effects, the 
oil stabilization funds may make transfers to cover the shortfalls. Until 2010, once the first tier 
funds reached their statutory ceilings (totaling about 1½ percent of GDP), any subsequent 
excesses were to be allocated to a second tier of funds that finance investment by subnational 
governments (50 percent), PEMEX investment (25 percent), and a fund to finance future costs 
of pension reform (25 percent). Resources held at the first-tier funds at end-2009 were 
equivalent to 1 percent of GDP.   27
 
Important developments concerning the fiscal framework took place in 2009-10, at a 
time when the Mexican economy was hit by a substantial external shock, reflecting in 
particular the strong real and financial linkages with the U.S. First, beginning in 2009 
investment by PEMEX was excluded from the calculation of the budget balance under the 
fiscal rule; this created room for a discretionary increase in spending. Second, the exceptional 
circumstances clause in the fiscal rule that allows a temporary widening of the deficit was 
invoked in the 2010 budget, with the deep recession and associated drop in revenues cited as 
the basis for the exception; a deficit of 0.5 percent of GDP in the balance targeted by the rule 
was budgeted. Third, the statutory caps on the resources held in the first tier oil funds—a key 
source of procyclicality—were suspended for 2010, allowing additional room for saving windfall 
revenues. 
 
Arguably, the balanced budget rule helped build credibility and contain fiscal deficits in 
recent years. In particular, it may have had disciplining effects on the legislature, where in the 
past there had been a tendency to increase spending allocations compared to the proposed 
budgets.  
  
This said, a higher level of savings of windfall oil revenues during the years prior to the 
crisis would have facilitated stronger fiscal support to domestic demand during the global 
financial crisis.  And the fiscal rule proved too constraining in 2009-10 in that compliance with 
the rule would have entailed a large withdrawal of fiscal stimulus. In the event, the fiscal rule 
was eased through the mechanisms discussed above. 
 
Importantly, a fiscal rule that targets the overall budget balance combined with the 
presence of significant oil revenues is procyclical, and so it has been in Mexico. Following the 
introduction of the rule, the rate of growth of spending increased and the NRPB deteriorated, 
at a time when savings in the oil funds were capped. And changes to the rule in 2009 and the 
suspension of the rule in 2010 were needed to avoid having to implement an unwarranted 
procyclical tightening in the midst of a deep recession. 
 
PERU (FISCAL RULE) 
In the late 1990s, and on the back of a sharp deterioration of the public finances in 
1998-99, a growing consensus emerged in Peru towards a formal strengthening of the fiscal 
framework, including through the adoption of numerical fiscal rules. One of the main 
motivations for this development was the desire to put the public debt on a firmly downward 
path. 
 
In 1999 a Fiscal Responsibility and Transparency Law (FRTL) was adopted, as a device 
to promote fiscal discipline and enhance fiscal transparency. The FRTL was partially modified 
with the introduction of the Fiscal Management Responsibility Law in 2003 and further 
changes were introduced in 2007. The legislation included procedural and fiscal transparency 
provisions, the requirement to prepare a multi-year macroeconomic and fiscal framework with 
rolling three-year fiscal projections, and numerical fiscal rules. The original FRTL fiscal rules 
targeted the deficit of the nonfinancial public sector, the rate of growth of general government 
expenditure (i.e., including local governments) in real terms; and debt ceilings for the local 
governments. 
 
The deficit ceilings for 2000-02 featured a declining path for the deficit, from 2 percent 
of GDP in 2000 to 1 percent of GDP in 2002 and thereafter. Following repeated breaches, the 
target was loosened in 2003, when a new sliding scale for the deficit was put in place, from 2 
percent of GDP in 2003 to 1 percent of GDP in 2005 and thereafter. The limit to the annual 
growth of expenditure in real terms was loosened in 2003 from 2 percent to 3 percent. The   28
coverage of expenditure under the rule was narrowed in 2007 to consumption of the central 
government (wages and salaries, goods and services, and pensions)—thus, investment 
spending and expenditure of the local governments were excluded from the spending rule. The 
limit on the rate of growth of current spending was also loosened to 4 percent. In addition, in 
2008 Congress approved legislation exempting the ministry of health from the current 
expenditure limits in 2008. 
 
Compliance with the deficit limits proved problematic in the early years (2000-02), but 
improved significantly in later years as mineral and other revenues boomed, and the limits 
were met with growing margins until 2008. On the other hand, compliance with the general 
government expenditure limits proved challenging in the context of the revenue boom despite 
the loosening of the limit in 2003. This, plus the lack of effective control of subnational 
spending, led to the narrowing of coverage in 2007 and the increase in the permitted rate of 
expenditure growth. This said, the expenditure rule, while undergoing several modifications, 
seems to have provided more of a binding constraint than the deficit rule. 
 
The global financial crisis put pressure on the fiscal rules. The government’s policy 
response included a significant countercyclical fiscal stimulus, which was facilitated by the 
savings accumulated during the boom (Rial, 2010). To accommodate this policy response, 
recourse was made to an exceptional escape clause in the FRTL that allowed for a temporary 
relaxation of the ceilings with congressional approval. Thus, a relaxation of the FRTL was 
approved in May 2009 to allow for a deficit of 2 percent of GDP in 2009-10 (returning to the 1 
percent limit in 2011) and a relaxation of the expenditure rule. 
 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO (OIL FUND) 
In 2000 Trinidad and Tobago’s government established an oil fund, the Interim 
Revenue Stabilization Fund (IRSF), with the aims of promoting fiscal discipline during oil 
booms, cushioning the effects of unexpected drops in oil prices, and promoting public saving. 
The fund was not formally approved by parliament, and after an initial transfer, remained 
inactive for a few years before receiving further transfers. Under the IRSF’s rules, deposits into 
(withdrawals from) the fund were to be made when quarterly oil revenues exceeded (fell short 
of) the quarterly revenues projected in the budget by at least 10 percent. Budget revenues were 
based on a discretionary reference price. Deposits were to be at least 2/3 of the difference 
between projected and actual revenues. 
  
In May 2007 the IRSF was replaced by the Heritage and Stabilization Fund (HSF). The 
new fund’s initial capital comprised the resources accumulated in the IRSF, which were 
transferred to the HSF. The HSF has stabilization and savings objectives. The stabilization 
objective is to cushion the impact on spending of petroleum revenue downturns. As regards 
saving, the fund aims at accumulating assets over time to generate an alternative income 
stream to support public spending after petroleum revenue declines and oil and gas resources 
are depleted. 
 
Under the HSF’s rules, at least 60 percent of oil and gas revenues in excess of budgeted 
amounts are to be deposited in the HSF, provided the excess is more than 10 percent of 
budgeted revenues. Withdrawals from the HSF are permitted in cases where actual oil and gas 
revenues fall at least 10 percent below budgeted revenues. The withdrawal can be up to 60 
percent of the shortfall, but not exceeding 25 percent of the resources in the HSF. Budgeted 
revenue is estimated on the basis of a reference oil price derived from an 11-year moving 
average of prices (the 5 years prior to the current fiscal year, and projected prices for the 
current year and for the next 5 years). 
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Despite the operation of the IRSF and the HSF, fiscal policy in Trinidad and Tobago 
was highly procyclical during the boom, with expenditures being increased massively over the 
period. 
 
VENEZUELA (FISCAL RULES AND OIL FUNDS) 
Venezuela’ history with oil funds goes back a long way. In the mid 1970s following the 
first oil price boom, the Venezuelan Investment Fund (FIV) was created. The objective of the 
fund was to help save a significant share of the oil windfall. In the event, part of the fund’s 
resources was soon diverted to financing domestic investments and taking equity in public 
enterprises that subsequently turned out to be loss makers. Thus, while Venezuela’s oil exports 
surged from US$3 billion in 1972 to US$20 billion in 1981, during the period the FIV saved 
only US$2.5 billion at the central bank. In the 1990s, some of the fund’s remaining resources 
were used to support loss-making state companies in the electricity sector – in effect, energy 
subsidies were provided off budget through the use of the FIV’s resources. 
 
Between 1998 and 2000 a new framework to help manage oil resources was put in 
place. First, an organic budget law was approved in 2000. The law was intended to strengthen 
fiscal policy and reduce expenditure volatility – a chronic problem in Venezuela. It focused on 
improving the budget process, including the use of a multiyear framework, and introduced 
multi-year numerical fiscal rules for the current balance, expenditure growth, and the public 
debt. Implementation of the law, however, was postponed.  Second, an oil stabilization fund, 
the Macroeconomic Investment and Stabilization Fund (FIEM) was also created. The objectives 
of the fund were to help insulate the budget and the economy from fluctuations in oil prices. As 
initially designed in late 1998, contributions to the fund were specified as the oil revenues 
above a reference value corresponding to a five-year moving average. Resources could only be 
drawn from the fund in a given year if oil revenues were below the reference value or resources 
in the fund exceeded 80 percent of the moving average of oil export revenues, in which case 
resources could be used to amortize public debt. 
 
The rules of the FIEM were substantially modified in 1999. The reference values 
triggering accumulation or withdrawal of resources were fixed at US$9 a barrel. Fifty percent 
of any oil revenues that accrued at a price above this value were to be deposited by the central 
government, the regional governments and PDVSA (the state oil company) in the FIEM. 
Discretionary withdrawals from the fund with government authorization and legislative 
approval were allowed. In 2001 the FIEM was modified again, and the government and PDVSA 
were exempted from the requirement to make deposits for a while. Many further changes were 
introduced in subsequent years in the context of the annual budgets.  
 
Over the years, the integration of the oil fund with overall fiscal policy has proved 
problematic. At times, high-cost borrowing took place to meet the FIEM’s rules. Specifically, 
during periods when the central government was in deficit, the required deposits could only be 
made in the fund by taking on public debt: the buildup of gross assets in the fund was financed 
by expensive borrowing. FIEM’s rules were frequently changed, ignored, or the operation of the 
fund was temporarily suspended. And the FIEM did not accumulate any significant resources 
during 2005-08 when oil prices surged. 
 
More broadly, the organic budget law and the FIEM were put in place with the 
objective of improving fiscal performance and smoothing expenditure, but they did not achieve 
this purpose – they did not prevent the implementation of highly procyclical fiscal policies 
during the oil boom and the subsequent slump. In fact, Clemente, Faris, and Puente (2002), 
using a general equilibrium model, find that the FIEM seems to have increased macroeconomic 
volatility.  
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APPENDIX B 
 
SUBSIDIES ON FUEL PRODUCTS AND THE FISCAL STANCE 
The NRPB indicator used in this paper is subject to an important caveat. In several 
OECs in the sample, fuel products are sold domestically at controlled prices that are often 
below international prices. Some of these subsidies are explicit (for example, the subsidies on 
imported products in Bolivia and the negative excise in Mexico). In most of the OECs in the 
sample, however, some or all the subsidies on fuel products sold domestically are implicit. 
Often, they are effectively netted against the national oil company’s oil revenue, as, for 
instance, in Ecuador and Venezuela.  
 
In a number of cases there is a lack of reliable time series of fuel subsidies consistent over time. 
In some countries there have been recurrent changes in the subsidization mechanisms, as well 
as institutional and fiscal accounting changes. The fiscal accounting treatment of various fuel 
subsidies also differs across countries. 
 
Therefore, to ensure comparability of treatment among the OECs in the sample, subsidies on 
fuel products sold domestically, whether implicit or explicit, have not been included in the 
NRPB. To the extent that domestic fuel prices failed to keep pace with international or import 
prices during the boom, subsidies increased over time and the fiscal impulse during the 
upswing would be underestimated by the measured NRPB. For example, in Mexico an excise 
acts as a tax or a subsidy depending on whether controlled domestic prices of fuels are higher 
or lower than international prices; the swing between the revenue collected from the excise in 




WHAT UNDERLIES THE EVOLUTION OF NONRESOURCE PRIMARY BALANCES? 
The nonresource fiscal stance in LAC NRECs over the last decade can be explained 
largely by the trends displayed by primary expenditure, but with significant differences across 
country groups. In the OECs, the simple average of the ratios of primary spending to NRGDP 
expanded strongly by about 12 percentage points of NRGDP between 2003 and 2008, leading to 
an average 8 percentage point increase in the nonresource primary deficit (see Figure A2). 
Average spending contracted in 2009 as the crisis set in, and the NRPB improved somewhat. In 
contrast, MECs displayed a more moderate expansion of primary spending until 2008 (with a 
relatively stable NRPB), but increased primary spending (and the nonresource deficit) strongly 
in 2009 in response to the global economic crisis (see Figure A3). 
 
   These differing trends can be seen from another angle by looking at the annual rates of 
increase of expenditure in real terms (see Figure A4). On average, primary expenditure in real 
terms expanded much more rapidly in OECs than in MECs during the boom: 16 percent a year 
in the former against 8 percent a year in the latter. These numbers compare with an average 
increase of 7 percent in a group of 10 comparator LAC countries (see footnote 8 in the main 
text). Within the OECs sample, Venezuela (2004-06) and Ecuador (2007-08) recorded the 
highest annual expenditure jumps in that period (with maximum rates of increase ranging 
from 25 to 45 percent). Bolivia and Mexico consistently recorded the more moderate 
expenditure expansions in their peer groups. In 2009, by contrast, all OECs (with the exception 
of Mexico) reduced primary expenditure in real terms (quite sharply in the case of Venezuela), 
while Chile and Peru significantly stepped it up in response to the global economic crisis. In the 
comparator group of LAC countries, primary expenditure increased in real terms in 2009 at a 
similar annual rate as during 2003-08. 
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The rates of increase of capital expenditure in real terms were generally larger than 
those of current spending across the sample until 2008: an average of 27 percent a year in 
OECs and 12 percent a year in MECs (see Figure A5). Trinidad and Tobago (2004-05) and 
Ecuador (2007-08) recorded the highest annual expansions in capital spending. The contraction 
in capital expenditure was quite sharp and generalized in OECs in 2009, while MECs recorded 
a staggering 40 percent increase in real terms resulting in large part from fiscal stimulus 
packages.  
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Figure A4: Evolution of Primary Expenditure during the Recent Cycle. 
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Figure A5: Evolution of Primary Expenditure during the Recent Cycle. 
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CALCULATION OF A LONG-TERM FISCAL BENCHMARK: AN EXAMPLE 
 
The calculations of long-term fiscal benchmarks used for the fiscal sustainability 
analysis in this paper involved the following steps:  
  Resource wealth (i.e., the present value of future fiscal resource revenue flows) was 
calculated on the basis of (annual) proven reserves estimates from BP (hydrocarbons) 
and the U.S. Geological Survey (minerals); constant real resource prices at the level 
observed in each particular year for which the analysis was carried out; 4-year average 
government take from resource production; and an interest rate of 3 percent in real 
terms (the historical average of long-dated U.S. treasury bonds); 
  Total government wealth was computed as the sum of the resource wealth and net 
government financial assets; 
  The long-term annuity out of the total government wealth was compared to the 
cyclically adjusted NRPB (i.e., nonresource revenue minus nonresource primary 
expenditure) as the relevant measure of the consumption out of the government wealth.  
Figure A6 shows a simulation of the long-term sustainability analysis undertaken in this 
paper, as applied to a representative NREC. The thin line corresponds to resource revenues 
that are declining in percent of NRGDP until they are exhausted after 20 years. The solid line 
(annuity) shows the sustainable level of consumption out of the government wealth over 35 (20 
plus 15) years. The latter is compared to the horizontal line that shows the continuation into 
the future of the cyclically-adjusted NRPB as of 2010. The gap between the last two lines 
suggests that the 2010 fiscal policy stance would be unsustainable from a long-term 
perspective.  
 
































































































































































































































Source: Author’s calculation. 
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